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² Glossary for the OASIS Security

- Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
- 4 V1.1

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 implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the
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- 44

45 **Table of Contents**

| 46 | 1 | Glossary | 4 |
|----|-----|--------------------------|------|
| 47 | 2 | References | 11 |
| 48 | Арр | endix A. Acknowledgments | 12 |
| 49 | Арр | endix B. Notices | . 13 |
| 50 | | | |

51 **1 Glossary**

52 This normative document defines terms used throughout the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language 53 (SAML) specifications and related documents.

54 Some definitions are derived directly from external sources (referenced in an appendix), some definitions 55 based on external sources have been substantively modified to fit the SAML context, and some are newly 56 developed for SAML. Please refer to the external sources for definitions of terms not explicitly defined

57 here.

58 Some definitions have multiple senses provided. They are denoted by (a), (b), and so on. References to 59 terms defined elsewhere in this glossary are italicized.

| Term | Definition |
|----------------------------|---|
| Access | To interact with a <i>system entity</i> in order to manipulate, use, gain knowledge of, and/or obtain a representation of some or all of a system entity's <i>resources</i> . [RFC2828] |
| Access Control | Protection of <i>resources</i> against unauthorized access; a process by which use of resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only authorized system entities according to that policy. [RFC2828] |
| Access Control Information | Any information used for access control purposes, including contextual information [X.812] . Contextual information might include source IP address, encryption strength, the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Portions of access control information may be specific to the request itself, some may be associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted, and others (for example, time of day) may be "environmental". [RFC2829] |
| Access Rights | A description of the type of authorized interactions a <i>subject</i> can have with a <i>resource</i> . Examples include read, write, execute, add, modify, and delete. [Taxonomy] |
| Active Role | A role that a <i>system entity</i> has donned when performing some operation, for example accessing a <i>resource</i> . |
| Administrative Domain | An environment or context that is defined by some combination of one or more administrative policies, Internet Domain Name registrations, civil legal entities (for example, individuals, corporations, or other formally organized entities), plus a collection of hosts, network devices and the interconnecting networks (and possibly other traits), plus (often various) network services and applications running upon them. An administrative domain may contain or define one or more security domains. An administrative domain may encompass a single site or multiple sites. The traits defining an administrative domain may, and in many cases will, evolve over time. Administrative domains may interact and enter into agreements for providing and/or consuming services across administrative domain boundaries. |

60 Following are the defined terms used in the SAML specifications and related documents.

| Term | Definition |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Administrator | A person who installs or maintains a system (for example, a SAML- based security system) or who uses it to manage <i>system entities</i> , users, and/or content (as opposed to application purposes; see also <i>End User</i>). An administrator is typically affiliated with a particular <i>administrative</i> <i>domain</i> and may be affiliated with more than one administrative domain. |
| Anonymity | The quality or state of being anonymous, which is the condition of having a name or identity that is unknown or concealed. [RFC2828] |
| Assertion | A piece of data produced by a <i>SAML authority</i> regarding either an act of authentication performed on a <i>subject</i> , attribute information about the subject, or authorization permissions applying to the subject with respect to a specified <i>resource</i> . |
| Asserting Party | Formally, the <i>administrative domain</i> that hosts one or more <i>SAML authorities</i> . Informally, an instance of a <i>SAML authority</i> . |
| Attribute | A distinct characteristic of an object (in SAML, of a <i>subject</i>). An object's attributes are said to describe it. Attributes are often specified in terms of physical traits, such as size, shape, weight, and color, etc., for real-world objects. Objects in cyberspace might have attributes describing size, type of encoding, network address, and so on. Which attributes of an object are salient is decided by the beholder. See also <i>XML attribute</i> . |
| Attribute Authority | A system entity that produces attribute assertions. [SAMLAgree] |
| Attribute Assertion | An assertion that conveys information about attributes of a subject. |
| Authentication | To confirm a <i>system entity</i> 's asserted <i>principal identity</i> with a specified, or understood, level of confidence. [CyberTrust] [SAMLAgree] |
| Authentication Assertion | An <i>assertion</i> that conveys information about a successful act of <i>authentication</i> that took place for a <i>subject</i> . |
| Authentication Authority | A system entity that produces authentication assertions. [SAMLAgree] |
| Authorization | The process of determining, by evaluating applicable <i>access control</i> <i>information</i> , whether a <i>subject</i> is allowed to have the specified types of <i>access</i> to a particular <i>resource</i> . Usually, authorization is in the context of authentication. Once a subject is authenticated, it may be authorized to perform different types of access. [Taxonomy] |
| Authorization Decision | The result of an act of authorization. The result may be negative, that is, it may indicate that the <i>subject</i> is not allowed any access to the <i>resource</i> . |
| Authorization Decision Assertion | An assertion that conveys information about an authorization decision. |
| Binding, Protocol Binding | An instance of mapping SAML request-response message exchanges into a specific protocol. Each binding is given a name in the pattern "SAML xxx binding". |
| Credentials | Data that is transferred to establish a claimed principal identity. [X.800] [SAMLAgree] |

| Term | Definition |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| End User | A natural person who makes use of resources for application purposes (as opposed to system management purposes; see <i>Administrator</i> , <i>User</i>). |
| Identifier | A representation (for example, a string) mapped to a <i>system entity</i> that uniquely refers to it. |
| Initial SOAP Sender | The SOAP sender that originates a SOAP message at the starting point of a SOAP message path. [WSGloss] |
| Login, Logon, Sign-On | The process whereby a <i>user</i> presents <i>credentials</i> to an <i>authentication authority</i> , establishes a <i>simple session</i> , and optionally establishes a <i>rich session</i> . |
| Logout, Logoff, Sign-Off | The process whereby a <i>user</i> signifies desire to terminate a <i>simple session</i> or <i>rich session</i> . |
| Markup Language | A set of <i>XML elements</i> and <i>XML attributes</i> to be applied to the structure of an XML document for a specific purpose. A markup language is typically defined by means of a set of <i>XML schemas</i> and accompanying documentation. For example, the <i>Security Assertion Markup Language</i> (SAML) is defined by two schemas and a set of normative SAML specification text. |
| Party | Informally, one or more <i>principals</i> participating in some process or communication, such as receiving an <i>assertion</i> or accessing a <i>resource</i> . |
| Policy Decision Point (PDP) | A system entity that makes authorization decisions for itself or for other system entities that request such decisions. [PolicyTerm] For example, a SAML PDP consumes authorization decision requests, and produces authorization decision assertions in response. A PDP is an "authorization decision authority". |
| Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) | A system entity that requests and subsequently enforces authorization decisions. [PolicyTerm] For example, a SAML PEP sends authorization decision requests to a PDP, and consumes the authorization decision assertions sent in response. |
| Principal | A system entity whose identity can be authenticated. [X.811] |
| Principal Identity | A representation of a principal's identity, typically an <i>identifier</i> . |
| Profile | A set of rules describing how to embed <i>assertions</i> into and extract them from a framework or protocol. Each profile is given a name in the pattern "xxx profile of SAML". |
| Proxy | a) An entity authorized to act for another. |
| | b) Authority or power to act for another. |
| | c) A document giving such authority. [Merriam] |
| Proxy Server | A computer process that relays a protocol between client and server computer systems, by appearing to the client to be the server and appearing to the server to be the client. [RFC2828] |
| Pull | To actively request information from a system entity. |

| Term | Definition |
|------------------------------|---|
| Push | To provide information to a system entity that did not actively request it. |
| Relying Party | A system entity that decides to take an action based on information from another system entity. For example, a SAML relying party depends on receiving assertions from an asserting party (a SAML authority) about a subject. |
| Requester, SAML Requester | A <i>system entity</i> that utilizes the SAML protocol to request services from another system entity (a <i>SAML authority</i> , a <i>responder</i>). The term "client" for this notion is not used because many system entities simultaneously or serially act as both clients and servers. In cases where the SOAP binding for SAML is being used, the SAML requester is architecturally distinct from the <i>initial SOAP sender</i> . |
| Resource | a) Data contained in an information system (for example, in the form of files, information in memory, etc). |
| | b) A service provided by a system. |
| | An item of system equipment (in other words, a system component such as hardware, firmware, software, or documentation). |
| | A facility that houses system operations and equipment. [RFC2828] |
| | SAML uses "resource" in the first two senses, and refers to resources by means of <i>URI references</i> . |
| Responder, SAML Responder | A system entity (a SAML authority) that utilizes the SAML protocol to respond to a request for services from another system entity (a <i>requester</i>). The term "server" for this notion is not used because many system entities simultaneously or serially act as both clients and servers. In cases where the SOAP binding for SAML is being used, the SAML responder is architecturally distinct from the <i>ultimate SOAP receiver</i> . |
| Role | Dictionaries define a role as "a character or part played by a performer" or "a function or position." Principals don various types of roles serially and/or simultaneously, for example, active roles and passive roles. The notion of an Administrator is often an example of a role. |
| SAML Authority | An abstract system entity in the SAML domain model that issues assertions. See also attribute authority, authentication authority, and policy decision point (PDP). |
| Security | A collection of safeguards that ensure the confidentiality of information, protect the systems or networks used to process it, and control access to them. Security typically encompasses the concepts of secrecy, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It is intended to ensure that a system resists potentially correlated attacks. [CyberTrust] |

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Security Architecture | A plan and set of principles for an <i>administrative domain</i> and its <i>security domains</i> that describe the security services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of its users, the system elements required to implement the services, and the performance levels required in the elements to deal with the threat environment. A complete security architecture for a system addresses administrative security, communication security, computer security, and prescribes security policies for each. A complete security architecture needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental threats. A security architecture should explicitly evolve over time as an integral part of its administrative domain's evolution. [RFC2828] |
| Security Assertion | An assertion that is scrutinized in the context of a security architecture. |
| Security Assertion Markup Language, SAML | The set of specifications describing <i>security assertions</i> that are encoded in <i>XML</i> , <i>profiles</i> for attaching the assertions to various protocols and frameworks, the request/response protocol used to obtain the assertions, and <i>bindings</i> of this protocol to various transfer protocols (for example, SOAP and HTTP). |
| Security Domain | An environment or context that is defined by security models and a <i>security architecture</i> , including a set of <i>resources</i> and set of <i>system entities</i> that are authorized to access the resources. One or more security domains may reside in a single <i>administrative domain</i> . The traits defining a given security domain typically evolve over time. [Taxonomy] |
| Security Policy | A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization provides security services to protect <i>resources</i> . Security policies are components of <i>security architectures</i> . Significant portions of security policies are implemented via <i>security services</i> , using <i>security policy expressions</i> . [RFC2828] [Taxonomy] |
| Security Policy Expression | A mapping of <i>principal identities</i> and/or <i>attributes</i> thereof with allowable actions. Security policy expressions are often essentially access control lists. [Taxonomy] |
| Security Service | A processing or communication service that is provided by a system to give a specific kind of protection to resources, where said resources may reside with said system or reside with other systems, for example, an authentication service or a PKI-based document attribution and authentication service. A security service is a superset of AAA services. Security services typically implement portions of <i>security policies</i> and are implemented via security mechanisms. [RFC2828] [Taxonomy] |
| Session | A lasting interaction between system entities, often involving a user, typified by the maintenance of some state of the interaction for the duration of the interaction. |
| Site | An informal term for an <i>administrative domain</i> in geographical or DNS name sense. It may refer to a particular geographical or topological portion of an administrative domain, or it may encompass multiple administrative domains, as may be the case at an ASP site. |

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| SSO Assertion, Single Sign- On Assertion | An assertion with conditions embedded that explicitly define its lifetime, and that also contains one or more statements about the authentication of a subject. Additional information about the subject, such as attributes, may also be included in the assertion. [SAMLBind] |
| Subject | A <i>principal</i> in the context of a <i>security domain</i> . SAML assertions make declarations about subjects. |
| System Entity | An active element of a computer/network system. For example, an automated process or set of processes, a subsystem, a person or group of persons that incorporates a distinct set of functionality. [RFC2828] [SAMLAgree] |
| Time-Out | A period of time after which some condition becomes true if some event has not occurred. For example, a <i>session</i> that is terminated because its state has been inactive for a specified period of time is said to "time out". |
| Ultimate SOAP Receiver | The SOAP receiver that is a final destination of a SOAP message. It is responsible for processing the contents of the SOAP body and any SOAP header blocks targeted at it. In some circumstances, a SOAP message might not reach an ultimate SOAP receiver, for example because of a problem at a SOAP intermediary. An ultimate SOAP receiver cannot also be a SOAP intermediary for the same SOAP message. [WSGIoss] |
| User | A natural person who makes use of a system and its resources for any purpose [SAMLAgree] |
| Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) | A compact string of characters for identifying an abstract or physical <i>resource</i> . [RFC2396] URIs are the universal addressing mechanism for resources on the World Wide Web. Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are a subset of URIs that use an addressing scheme tied to the resource's primary access mechanism, for example, their network "location". |
| URI Reference | A <i>URI</i> that is allowed to have an appended number sign (#) and fragment identifier. [RFC2396] Fragment identifiers address particular locations or regions within the identified resource. |
| XML | Extensible Markup Language, abbreviated XML, describes a class of data objects called XML documents and partially describes the behavior of computer programs which process them. [XML] |
| XML Attribute | An XML data structure that is embedded in the start-tag of an XML element and that has a name and a value. For example, the italicized portion below is an instance of an XML attribute: <address addressid="A12345"></address> See also attribute. |

| Term | Definition |
|---------------|---|
| XML Element | An XML data structure that is hierarchically arranged among other such structures in an XML document and is indicated by either a start-tag and end-tag or an empty tag. For example: |
| | <address addressid="A12345"></address> |
| XML Namespace | A collection of names, identified by a <i>URI reference</i> , which are used in XML documents as element types and attribute names. An XML namespace is often associated with an <i>XML schema</i> . For example, SAML defines two schemas, and each has a unique XML namespace. |
| XML Schema | The format developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) for describing rules for a <i>markup language</i> to be used in a set of XML documents. In the lowercase, a "schema" or "XML schema" is an individual instance of this format. For example, SAML defines two schemas, one containing the rules for XML documents that encode security assertions and one containing the rules for XML documents that encode request/response protocol messages. Schemas define not only XML elements and XML attributes, but also datatypes that apply to these constructs. |

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104 Appendix A. Acknowledgments

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